Low-Complexity Cloud Image Privacy Protection via Matrix Perturbation by Wu, Xuangou et al.
Low-Complexity Cloud Image Privacy Protection
via Matrix Perturbation
Xuangou Wu∗, Shaojie Tang†, and Panlong Yang‡,
∗the School of Computer Science and Technology, AHUT, Ma’anshan, China
†University of Texas at Dallas, USA
‡the Institute of Communication Engineering, PLAUST, Nanjing, China
Emails: wxgou@mail.ustc.edu.cn, tangshaojie@gmail.com, panlongyang@gmail.com
Abstract—Cloud-assisted image services are widely used for
various applications. Due to the high computational complexity
of existing image encryption technology, it is extremely challeng-
ing to provide privacy preserving image services for resource-
constrained smart device. In this paper, we propose a novel
encrypressive cloud-assisted image service scheme, called eCIS.
The key idea of eCIS is to shift the high computational cost to the
cloud allowing reduction in complexity of encoder and decoder on
resource-constrained device. This is done via compressive sensing
(CS) techniques, compared with existing approaches, we are able
to achieve privacy protection at no additional transmission cost.
In particular, we design an encryption matrix by taking care
of image compression and encryption simultaneously. Such that,
the goal of our design is to minimize the mutual information of
original image and encrypted image. In addition to the theoretical
analysis that demonstrates the security properties and complexity
of our system, we also conduct extensive experiment to evaluate
its performance. The experiment results show that eCIS can
effectively protect image privacy and meet the user’s adaptive
secure demand. eCIS reduced the system overheads by up to
4.1× ∼ 6.8× compared with the existing CS based image
processing approach.
Index Terms—Privacy-protection, cloud security, compressive
sensing, encryption matrix.
I. INTRODUCTION
During the recent years, cloud-assisted image services are
widely used for various applications, such as individual image
storage and sharing by smartphone (e.g., Facebook and QQ),
healthcare image monitoring by wireless sensors [20], [1] and
so on. However, this also brings serious security threat to
users because of the public access of cloud [2]. Meanwhile,
more and more resource-constrained smart devices are used
as sensors for sampling these image signals, this also poses
a great challenge to the development of appropriate image
encryption techniques for mobile device.
Existing cloud security image encryption techniques usu-
ally follow compression then encryption paradigm. These
techniques require image acquisition device to perform ei-
ther expensive coding or encryption operation [17], [26]
on original image. For example, transformed-based image
coding techniques require complex encoding computation. In
recent years, compressive sensing (CS) has bee proposed
for sparse/compressible signal sampling and compression. C.
Wang et.al. proposed a cloud-assisted computation outsourcing
scheme for healthcare video monitoring [25]. They imple-
mented image encryption by linear programming (LP) problem
transformation, which is the application of LP secure out-
sourcing problem [24]. However, the transformation overhead
may easily outweigh the benefits brought by their outsourcing
scheme.
As a result, existing results are not appropriate for resource
constrained smart device as it requires low-complexity image
compression and encryption. In particular, we notice that
existing techniques require expensive computation resource
mainly due to the following two separated processes: image
compression and encryption. To this end, we propose a novel
encrypressive Cloud-assisted Image Service scheme (eCIS). In
eCIS, we implement image compression and encryption simul-
taneously via CS, which can significantly reduce the resource
consumption for sampling and receiver devices. Meanwhile,
we implement cloud storage and computation outsourcing
for image user at no additional communication cost. The
development of eCIS faces several unique challenges: (1) How
to design encryption matrix to meet CS theory and image
signal encryption without increasing transmission cost? (2)
How to implement encryption matrix to meet low-complexity
requirement for encoder and end user? (3) How to guarantee
user’s privacy performance with our design encryption matrix?
To address the above challenges, we design an encryption
matrix based on inverse matrix and mutual information to
meet CS encryption encoding and decoding at no additional
transmission cost. To achieve low-complexity encryption and
decryption for encoder and end user, we exploit adaptive
perturbation matrix as our encryption matrix. Moreover, we
conduct theoretical analysis that demonstrates several security
properties and low-complexity of our scheme. The contribu-
tions of this paper are as the follows.
1) We present a novel encrypressive cloud-assisted image
service scheme via CS, called eCIS. Our scheme implements
the image signal storage and computation outsourcing for both
sampling device and end user. Meanwhile, it also can protect
user’s image signal privacy.
2) We formulate our security problem according to security
and system requirements, and design an encryption matrix
based on mutual information. Our designed encryption matrix
implements compression and encryption simultaneously. We
also conduct theoretical analyses of both image security and
system overhead.
3) With the extensive experiments, we show that eCIS
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not only protect image privacy efficiently but also meet the
user’s adaptive security demand. The experimental results
also display that eCIS decrease 4.1× ∼ 6.8× time cost for
sampling device and end user compared with the existing CS
based image processing approach.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2
presents the related preliminaries. The problem statement is
given in section 3. The detailed design of eCIS is presented
in Section 4. In section 5, we give the theoretical performance
analysis of eCIS. Section 6 reports our experimental results.
We present a literature review of existing work in section 7.
Finally, we make a conclusion and future work in section 8.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. CS and Compressive Signal
CS theory asserts that a relatively small number linear
combination of a sparse signal could contain most of its salient
information [11]. This technique shifts the computation cost
from encoder to decoder compared with transformed-based
image compression [4]. Assuming that s ∈ Rn is a t-sparse
signal, which has only t non-zero components. Thus, the
information can be extracted from s by y = Φs, where Φ is an
m × n measurement matrix, y ∈ Rm is measurement vector
and m  n. If Φ satisfies the restricted isometric property
(RIP) and m ≥ O(t · log(n/t)) [6], the sparse signal s could
be recovered with high probability. Cande`s, Romberg, and
Tao [5] and Donoho [11] have shown many random matrices
that satisfy the RIP such as Gaussian identity distribution
matrix, ±1 Bernoulli matrix and so on. The signal s could
be recovered via `1 optimization as
sˆ = arg min
s
‖ s ‖1 s.t. y = Φs
There have been many efficient algorithms to solve the above
problems such as basis pursuit [6], orthogonal matching pur-
suit (OMP) algorithm [23], CoSaMP [18] and so on.
The real image signal, however, is rarely sparse, which can
be transformed into sparse signal by a sparse representation
basis. In other words, this signal can be well-approximated
by a sparse signal, which is called compressible signal. For
example, an image signal x ∈ Rn can usually be transformed
into a sparse signal s under discrete cosine transformation
(DCT) basis or discrete wavelet transformation (DWT) basis.
Given x = Ψs and Ψ is a n × n representation basis,
s = [s1, s2, · · · , sn]T is the coefficient vector of x under
Ψ. If x is compressible, then the magnitudes of the sorted
coefficients si observe a power-law decay :
|si| ≤ C · i−q
where C and q > 0 are constants. The compressible signal x
can be represented accurately by only t (t  n) coefficients
[10].
B. Mutual Information
In information theory, mutual information represents the
mean relevance of two random variables which is defined as
follows.
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s 'sFig. 1. System architecture of eCIS.
Definition 1. [22] Consider two random variables X and
Y with a joint probability mass function p(xy), marginal
probability mass functions p(y) and conditional probability
function p(y/x). The mutual information I(X;Y ) is :
I(X;Y ) =
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
p(xy) log2
p(y/x)
p(y)
= −
∑
y∈Y
p(y) log2 p(y) +
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
p(xy) log2 p(y/x)
= H(Y )−H(Y/X) (1)
where H(Y ) and H(Y/X) represent entropy and conditional
entropy, respectively.
The smaller I(X;Y ) is, the less the information of X
obtained from Y . If X and Y are two independent random
variables, I(X;Y ) equals to zero. It means that no information
of X could be obtained from Y .
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
A. System Architecture
Fig.1 shows the overall architecture of eCIS. The system
consists of three parties: sampling device, cloud, and end user.
The sampling device is responsible for sampling, compress-
ing, and encrypting the original image signal. After image
sampling, the device carries out compression and encryption
operations. Then the sampling device uploads its compressed
and encrypted signal y′ and measurement matrix Φ to the
cloud. If an end user wants to access the image, he should send
its request and sparse representation basis, Ψ, to the cloud.
Cloud receives the user’s image request and Ψ, and calculates
the sparse signal s′ via CS decoding algorithm and sends it to
the end user. After receiving s′, the end user is responsible for
recovering the original image f by s′. We assume that the key
of encryption matrix cloud be securely transmitted between the
sampling device and end user. In practice, sampling device and
end user could be the same smart device(e.g., smartphone).
Design goals: Our goals consist of three aspects: (1) The
sampling device should implement image compression and
protect the user’s image privacy. Meanwhile, the compression
and encryption process should have low complexity and trans-
mission cost. (2) The cloud should carry out complicated CS-
based image decoding without leaking user’s privacy. (3) The
image recovery and decryption at end user should also have
low complexity.
B. CS-based Image Compression
Before the problem formulation, we first introduce several
important notations used in CS-based image compression. The
original image signal and its sparse representation basis are
denoted by f and Ψ, respectively. The corresponding sparse
signal of f under Ψ is denoted by s, namely, s = Ψ−1f .
Firstly, we review CS-based image compression and decod-
ing for image signal f . The compression process is expressed
as
y = Φf = ΦΨs (2)
where y presents the measurement vector. The decoding
process is expressed as
sˆ = arg min
s∈Rn
‖s‖1 s.t. y = ΦΨs (3)
where sˆ is the recovery sparse signal corresponding to f ,
with fˆ = Ψsˆ. If the attacker does not know Φ and Ψ, the
measurement vector y can be considered as ciphertext [19].
However, if the recovery process is carried out in cloud,
the measurement vector y is no longer private because both
Φ and Ψ are public. Then how to outsource expensive CS
decoding task to the cloud without revealing the original image
signal? Since the measurement matrix has a strong encryption
function, can we consider different measurement matrices for
encoding and decoding of sampling device and cloud?
Assuming that the decoding measurement matrix used in
cloud is Φ, which could be general measurement matrix such
as Gaussian random matrix, ±1 Bernoulli matrix [5]. The
encoding measurement matrix is denoted by ΦA, where A
is a n × n matrix. Then, the image compression process is
expressed as
y′ = ΦAf (4)
where y′ is measurement vector corresponding to ΦA. Due to
f = Ψs, Eq. 4 can be expressed as
y′ = ΦAf = ΦAΨs (5)
If A is invertible, AΨ can be converted as ΨB, with B =
Ψ−1AΨ. Eq. 5 is equivalent to
y′ = ΦAf = ΦΨBs = ΦΨs′ (6)
where s′ = Bs. After image compression, the cloud carries
out the decoding operation as
sˆ′ = arg min
s∈Rn
‖s′‖1 s.t. y′ = ΦΨs′ (7)
where sˆ′ is the recovery signal corresponding to s′ via solving
`1 optimization problem. Therefore, if we can find a suitable
matrix A satisfied three conditions: (1) A is invertible. (2) A
can not decrease the sparsity of s. (3) s can not be obtained
from s′ without A. We can implement secure image data
storage and CS decoding in the cloud.
C. Problem Formulation
We next introduce the problem formulation. In the rest
of this paper, Φ and A are called measurement matrix and
encryption matrix, respectively. If an attacker can not recover
f given s′ and Ψ, we can securely implement image decoding
in the cloud. Therefore, our problem is to find an appropriate
encryption matrix A∗ such that
(P) A∗ = arg min
A∈Rn×n
P (A,Φ, f)
s.t. y′ = ΦAf = ΦΨs′
s′ = Ψ−1AΨs
C(Φ, A, f) ≤ C(Φ, f)
where P(·) is privacy exposure function which will be de-
scribed later, C(·) is communication cost function. C(Φ, A, f)
≤ C(Φ, f) ensures that the transmission cost of our scheme is
no larger than the original CS based image compression.
IV. OUR SOLUTION
In this section, we will discuss our encryption matrix design
and implement in detail, and give each component design of
our eCIS.
A. Encryption Matrix Design and Implement
1) Design Principle: Recall that our goal of encryption
matrix is to ensure that the original sparse signal of user’s
image can not be obtained from the recovered sparse signal
in the cloud. If the encryption matrix does not change the
sparsity of original image signal, we can remove the condition
of C(Φ, A, f) ≤ C(Φ, f) from the problem (P). This is because
when the measurement matrix is given, the number of CS
measurements which only depends on the sparsity of the
compressed signal.
In information theory, mutual information represents the
shared information between two random variables according
to Definition 1. In this work, we exploit mutual information
as our privacy exposure function. Intuitively, it measures
what extent s can be inferred from s′. We assume that
s = [s1, s2, · · · , sn]T , s′ = [s′1, s′2, · · · , s′n]T , si ∈ {a1, a2,
· · · , am}, and s′i ∈ {b1, b2, · · · , bm} for i = 1, 2, · · · ,m.
each of the presentation, we also assume ξA = {a1, a2,
· · · , am}, ξB = {b1, b2, · · · , bm}, P{sk = ai} = p(ai),
and P{s′k = bj} = p(bj). Accordingly, the problem (P) is
equivalent to
(P1) min
P (s′/s)
I(s; s′)
s.t. s′ = Bs
B = Ψ−1AΨ
According to Definition 1, I(s; s′) = H(s′)−H(s′/s). Since
s and s′ can be considered as discrete memoryless n times
extension of single symbol, H(s′) is given by
H(s′) = −
n∑
i1=1
· · ·
n∑
in=1
p(ai1 · · · ain) log p(ai1 · · · ain)
= −
n∑
i1=1
· · ·
n∑
in=1
n∏
k=1
p(aik) log
n∏
k=1
p(aik)
= nH(ξB)
Similarly, H(s′/s) is given by
H(s′/s) = −
n∑
i1=1
· · ·
n∑
in=1
n∑
j1=1
· · ·
n∑
jn=1
p(ai1 · · · ain)
p(bj1 · · · bjn/ai1 · · · ain) log2 p(bj1 · · · bjn/ai1 · · · ain)
= −
n∑
i1=1
· · ·
n∑
in=1
n∑
j1=1
· · ·
n∑
jn=1
p(ai1 · · · ain)
n∏
k=1
p(aik )p(bjk/aik log
n∏
k=1
p(bjk/aik )
= n(H(ξB)−H(ξB/ξA))
According to Eq.1, I(s; s′) is given by
I(s; s′) = H(s′)−H(s′/s)
= n(H(ξB)−H(ξB/ξA))
In order to minimize I(s; s′), it is equivalent to minimizing
H(ξB) − H(ξB/ξA). When H(ξB/ξA) = H(ξB), I(s; s′)
achieves the minimum value (I(s, s′) = 0), this is because
H(ξB) and H(ξB/ξA) are greater than or equal to 0. Note
that H(ξB/ξA) = H(ξB) implies that p(bj/ai) = p(bj)
for i, j = 1, 2, · · · , n. Namely, the events ai and bj are
independent to each other. In other words, s can not be
recovered from s′ if all elements are independent to each other.
The goal of encryption matrix is to minimize I(s; s′). When
the image signal is given, the value of I(s; s′) is decided by the
conditional probability transform matrix, Γ, which is denoted
by
Γ =

p(b1/a1) p(b2/a1) · · · p(bn/a1)
p(b1/a2) p(b2/a2) · · · p(bn/a2)
...
...
. . .
...
p(b1/an) p(b2/an) · · · p(bn/an)

The conditional probability transform matrix should be imple-
mented by encryption matrix. When encryption matrix make
P (ξA) and P (ξB) independently of each other, our goal that
s can not be obtained from s′ could be achieved. Although
P (ξB) can be any probability distribution, we should carefully
choose a probability distribution to facilitate our implemen-
tation. In this work, we set P (ξB) as discrete equivalent
probability distribution, namely, p(bi) = p(aj/bi) = 1/n for
each i and j. Therefore, Γ can be expressed as
Gamma =

1/n 1/n · · · 1/n
1/n 1/n · · · 1/n
...
...
. . .
...
1/n 1/n · · · 1/n

According to the above P (ξB) and Γ, A should implement all
the nonzero elements of s with uniform distribution for s′.
2) Encryption Matrix Implementation: In this part, we
give our encryption matrix A implementation based on above
analysis. We exploit random perturbation identity matrix as A
to implement the function of conditional probability transfor-
mation matrix Γ. The definition of A is
A = pi(I) (8)
where I is identity matrix. pi(·) is random perturbation func-
tion with the same probability, which is equivalent to randomly
perturbing the rows of I . According to this definition, we know
that A is an invertible matrix. Meanwhile, A has encryption
function because it could implement all the elements of s
and s′ to be independent to each other. Since B equals to
Ψ−1AΨ and s = Bs′, B only perturbs the element location
of s, and the sparsity of s is not changed. So our designed
encryption matrix satisfies three conditions of section 3.2. If
all the elements of s are perturbed by A, we only need to
implement the equal probability random perturbation for each
element. In fact, A could be easily implemented by a random
seed, which is also considered as the key between the sampling
device and the end user.
To quantify the privacy protection level more effectively,
and make a more detailed description on security considera-
tions, we next introduce the concept of k-secure.
Definition 2. The encryption matrix A is k-secure if the
number of permutation rows is k. It is denoted by
Ak = pik(I) (9)
Ak is called k-secure.
If k = 0, A0 is equivalent to I , i.e., no encryption operation
is carried out. On the other hand, we achieve the highest
security level by setting k = n , i.e., perturb all elements in
original sparse signal. Consider that s is sparse, in order to im-
plement non-zero elements of s′ with uniform distribution, we
should select more non-zero elements to carry out perturbation
operations. If the non-zero elements distribution of s is known,
the same probability can be used as perturbation probability for
each element. Otherwise, uniform random selection is adopted
for each element.
Since A is random perturbation matrix of I , ΦA is equiva-
lent to perturb the column of Φ. The image compression and
encryption could be implemented simultaneously.
B. System Design
Encryption and compression component: Sampling de-
vice is responsible for sampling, compression and encryption
operations. We mainly consider compression and encryption
after image signal sampling. In encryption and compression
component, we exploit the common measurement matrix,
Gaussian random matrix Φ, as our measurement matrix. The
encryption and compression process is calculate as y′ = ΦAf .
Due to A is random perturbation identity matrix by identity
matrix I , it can be implemented by a random seed. ΦA is
equivalent to perturb the column of Φ.
Cloud component: In eCIS, cloud component is responsi-
ble for storing user’s compressed image signal y′ and decoding
the encryption sparse signal s′. If there is no user’s request,
cloud only stores the user’s image signal y′ and Φ. If the user
requests an image signal, it sends Ψ to the cloud. The cloud
receives the user’s request and Ψ, and carries out CS decoding
operation according to Eq. 7. After decoding the encryption
sparse signal s′, the cloud sends it to the end user. Considering
that cloud could be publicly accessible, the attacker can obtain
s′ and Ψ. Although the attacker can obtain the user’s data,
it can only recover the encryption image signal via Ψs′
(Af = Ψs′). According to our encryption matrix, cloud can
implement both storage and decoding computation functions
allowing significant reduction of resource consumption on the
sampling device and end user.
End user component: The end user is responsible for
decrypting and recovering the original image. If the end user
receives s′, it carries out decryption and recovery operations.
According to Eq. 6, we know Af = Ψs′. Therefore, the
recovered signal is given by
f = A−1Ψs′ (10)
Since A is random perturbation identity matrix of identity
matrix I , A−1 is equivalent to the transpose form of A.
Therefore, f = ATΨs′. ATΨ is equivalent to perturbing the
rows of Ψ. The image recovery and decryption could be easily
implemented, and eCIS does not need complicated decryption
operation compared with transformed-based image recovery.
V. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
A. Security Issue
According to our encryption matrix definition as shown
in Eq.9, if the attacker wants to obtain the original sparse
signal and A is k-secure, he should investigate all possible
arrangements as
C(n, k)× n(n− 1) · · · (n− k + 1) = C(n, k) · n!
(n− k)!
where C(n, k) = n!(n−k)!k! . If the attacker also does not know
the value of k, the number of possible combinations is
n∑
k=1
(C(n, k) · n!
(n− k)! )
Suppose that the attacker knows the value of k, the probability
to successfully recover s, Psuc, can be calculated according
to Stirling’s approximation [12]
Psuc =
1
C(n, k)× n!(n−k)!
=
1
C(n, k)× C(n, k)× k!
≤ 1
e(en2/k)k
≤ 1
e(en)k
= e−(k logn+k+1) (11)
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Fig. 2. Example of s and s′ under A.
If the recovery probability is required to be less than β, k
should satisfy the following inequality:
k ≥
⌈− log β − 1
log n+ 1
⌉
The signal s, however, is sparse, the attacker may not
need to try too many perturbations of zero elements. To
simplify the problem analysis, we do not consider the nonzero
element probability distribution of s. We assume that there
are l perturbed elements among s and s′ to be considered.
According to Eq.11, the probability of successfully recovered
s, Psuc, is given by
Psuc =
1
C(n, l)× n!
(n−l)!
≤ 1
e(en)l
= e−(l logn+l+1) (12)
Nextly, we calculate the value of l. We suppose that s
is t-sparse and A is k-secure. First of all, we look at what
circumstance the attacker does not need to consider. For
example, Fig.2 shows that 4 elements are perturbed between s
and s′, namely, A is 4-secure. The attacker only needs to guess
the first two elements 0 and 5, and does not consider the other
two perturbed 0 elements. In other words, the attacker does not
consider the case of two zero elements perturbation. Since the
number of selection zero elements is decided by the non-zero
element distribution, we conduct the security analyses with
uniform and nonuniform distribution of non-zero elements in
s.
1) Uniform Distribution: When the nonzero element fol-
lows uniform distribution in s, each zero element of s has
the same perturbation probability. The probability of two zero
elements perturbation is
n− t
n
· n− 1− t
n− 1 =
(n− t)(n− t− 1)
n(n− 1)
Therefore, the average number of zero elements which is not
to be considered is
k · (n− t)(n− t− 1)
n(n− 1)
The number of perturbed elements which needs to be consid-
ered, l, is
l = k · (1− (n− t)(n− t− 1)
n(n− 1) ) =
kt(2n− t− 1)
n(n− 1)
Given that t(2n−t−1)/(n(n−1)) is a constant, the number
of perturbed elements l can be denoted by α · k, where α =
t(2n− t−1)/(n(n−1)) and 0 < α < 1. According to Eq.12,
Psuc can be calculated as
Psuc ≤ 1
e(en)αk
= e−(αk(logn+1)+1) (13)
Eq.13 indicates that the complexity to recover the original
signal is O(nαk logn). If the recovery probability is required
to be less than β, k should satisfy the following inequality:
k ≥
⌈ − log β − 1
α(log n+ 1)
⌉
=
⌈
n(n− 1)(− log β − 1)
t(2n− t− 1)(log n+ 1)
⌉
2) Nonuniform Distribution: We next study the case when
the nonzero element follows nonuniform distribution in s, we
denote the distribution probability is P (s) and the probability
of the ith location is p(si). We also assume that the element
selection probability is q(si). The expected probability for
choosing an non-zero element in one selection is
∑n
i=1 p(si) ·
q(si). The probability that we choose two zero elements
for a perturbation is (1 −∑ni=1 p(si)q(si))2. To reduce the
number of selected zero elements,
∑n
i=1 p(si)q(si) should be
as large as possible. According to principle of the maximum,∑n
i=1 p(si)q(si) achieves a maximum value if q(si) is equal
to p(si). In other words, the expected number of selected zero
element is minimized if the selection strategy is the same as
the nonzero elements distribution.
Since q(si) is equivalent to p(si), the number of perturbed
elements which the attacker needs to consider can be expressed
as
l = k · (1− (1−
n∑
i=1
p(si)
2)2)
Then, Psuc is given by
Psuc ≤ e−((1−(1−
∑n
i=1 p(si)
2)2)k(logn+1)+1) (14)
If the recovery probability is required to be less than β, the
value k should satisfy the following inequality
k ≥
⌈
(− log β − 1)
((1− (1−∑ni=1 p(si)2)2) log n+ 1)
⌉
When the distribution of nonzero elements is unknown, we
consider the perturbed elements as uniform random strategy,
and q(si) is equivalent to 1/n. Therefore,
Psuc ≤ e−((1−(1− 1n
∑n
i=1 p(si))
2)k(logn+1)+1)
= e−(
2n−1
n2
k(logn+1)+1) (15)
Eq.15 indicates that the complexity to recover the original
signal is O(n(k logn)/n). If the recovery probability is required
to be less than β, the value of k should satisfy the following
inequality.
k ≥
⌈
(−n2 log β − 1)
((2n− 1) log n+ 1)
⌉
Remark: According to the above security analysis, the
user can adjust the security level k according to his privacy
requirement. For k-secure requirements, the computational
complexity for attacker is O(n(tk logn)/n) when uniform distri-
bution is concerned for non-zero elements, and O(n(k logn)/n)
when non-uniform distribution is concerned.
B. Overhead Analysis
Computational Complexity: In this part, we analyze com-
putational complexity for each component of eCIS. For com-
pression and encryption operations, it calculates y′ = ΦAf .
Since A is random perturbation matrix of identity matrix
I , calculating ΦA is equivalent to perturbing the column
of Φ whose complexity is O(mn). If the sampling device
only carries out CS-based compression without encryption,
the complexity is also O(mn). If the sampling device takes
LP transform outsourcing [25], its complexity is O(nθ +mn)
(2 < θ < 3).
For end user component, the decryption and recovery pro-
cesses are f = A−1Ψs′, and A−1 is equivalent to A−T .
Computing ATΨ only requires to perturb the rows of Ψ ,
thus the complexity of end user component is O(n2). Assume
the end user computes the CS solution via Eq. 3 without
outsourcing it to the cloud, the computation cost would be
O(n3) (e.g [23]).
At the cloud side, the computation cost is O(n3) which
is equivalent to the complexity of solving Eq. 7. In eCIS,
we shift the `1 optimization from the end user to the cloud
without adding extra computation cost. More importantly,
eCIS provides privacy protection compared with the original
cloud-assisted CS decoding.
Communication Cost: In eCIS, the transmission cost be-
tween the sampling device and cloud is measured by the
number of CS measurements that are transmitted. Since our
scheme does not change the sparsity of the original image
signal, the transmission cost remains the same as that of the
nonencryption CS-based image data compression. Although
the scheme proposed in [25] has the same transmission cost
between the sampling device and cloud, the transmission cost
between cloud and end user is very high because the cloud
needs to send the encrypted original image data to the end user.
In our scheme, cloud only sends the encrypted sparse signal to
the end user allowing great reduction of the transmission cost.
For example, when the compression ratio is no less than 50%,
our scheme can reduce half of the transmission cost compared
with the scheme proposed in [25].
VI. EXPERIMENT
In this section, we carry out extensive experiments to
evaluate the performance of eCIS. In our experiment, we
use different test sequences as the signal source of resource-
constrained device. Our experiment is implemented via MAT-
LAB, on a laptop with an Intel Core i5 CPU running at
1.6GHz and 4G RAM. Gaussian random matrix is considered
as our measurement matrix. Since the original image signal is
not sparse in spatial domain, we select DCT basis as sparse
representation basis because it is the most common sparse
representation basis for image compression. In order to effi-
ciently implement eCIS, the experimental images are divided
(a1) (b1) (c1) (d1) (e1)
(a2) (b2) (c2) (d2) (e2)
Fig. 3. Cloud-assisted image encryption with different block sizes. (a1) and (a2). Original images. (b1) and (b2). 16× 16 pixels of block size. (c1) and (c2).
24× 24 pixels of block size. (d1) and (d2). 32× 32 pixels of block size. (e1) and (e2). Recovery image of end user.
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(a) “Soccer”. (b) “Goldhill”.
Fig. 4. PSNR comparison of recovery image between cloud and end user
with different block size.
into multiple the same size blocks. We also transform 2-
dimension block pixel values into 1-dimension signal via row
sequence to meet CS requirement. Meanwhile, we evaluate the
performances of our scheme form two aspects: effectiveness
and computation overhead.
A. Effectiveness Evaluation
Our goal of effectiveness evaluation is to display image
recovery performance of cloud and end user. We evaluate its
performance from three aspects: different block size, different
security level, and adaptive region of interest (ROI) of test
images. In our experiment, subjective visual effect and peak
signal-to-noise ratio (PSNR) are considered as metrics to
evaluate the quality of the recovery image. PSNR is defined
as
PSNR = 10× log10
2552
MSE
where MSE is mean square error of gray scale pixel values
between the original and recovery images.
 
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 5. Cloud-assisted image encryption of one block. (a) Original image
and selected block. (b) 40× 40 pixels block. (c) Cloud recovery image with
n-secure. (d) Recovery image of end user.
1) Impact of Block Size: In our experiment, the size of the
division image block needs to consider the following three
issues:
1) The block size affects the secure performance of eCIS.
The greater the size of division block is, the smaller the
probability that the original signal is successfully recovered
by the attacker.
2) The block size affects the scale of `1 optimization
problem, namely, Eq.7. The greater size Eq.7 solves, the more
time the problem requires.
3) The block size affects the compression performance of
image source and the communication cost between sampling
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Fig. 6. Cloud-assisted image encryption with different security level. (a) Original image of “Lenna”. (b) n-secure. (c) n/2-secure. (d) n/3-secure. (e) Recovery
image of end user.
device and cloud. The greater the size of division block is,
the better the sparsity of compression block cloud obtain.
The sparse level decides the number of transmission CS mea-
surements, which affects the transmission cost from sampling
device to cloud.
Fig.3 displays the experiment results of our scheme with
different block sizes and n-secure with uniform distribution
random perturbation.Fig.3 (a1) and (a2) are the original image
sources of “Soccer” and “Goldhill”. Fig.3 (b1) and (b2) display
the cloud recovery image with 16 × 16 pixels of block size.
Fig.3 (c1) and (c2) are 24×24 pixels of block size. Fig.3 (d1)
and (d2) are 32×32 pixels of block size. Fig.3 (e1) and (e2) are
recovery image of end user. According to Fig.3, it illustrates
that the recovery images of cloud become more ambiguous
with the increasing the block size. Fig.4 displays PSNR
comparison of recovery image between cloud and end user
across different block size. The experiment is implemented
under the same number of measurements for the same block
size. It shows that the recovery numerical performance of
end user is much better than the cloud. In cloud, the PSNR
of “Soccer” and “Goldhill” are less than 29dB and 29.5dB,
respectively.
Fig.5 displays experimental result of cloud-assisted image
encryption with 40×40 pixels of block size of image “soccer”.
The red image block of Fig.5 (a) is our selected block.
The experiment was implemented with n-secure and uniform
distribution random perturbation. The experimental results
displays that the image details are invisible at all as shown
in Fig.5 (c). However, each encryption block still represents
average pixel values of the original image from visual aspect
as shown in Fig.3. The reason is that the mainly energy of
block under DCT basis focus on only one few low frequency
coefficients. If the user wants to make the encryption image
become more ambiguous from visual aspect, we could increase
the division block size.
2) Security Level Considerations: In this part, we demon-
strate the experiment results of eCIS with different security
levels. Fig.6 shows that our results on image “Lenna” and
under uniform distribution random perturbation. Fig.6 (a)
displays the original image. Fig.6 (b), (c), and (d) display
the recovered images using cloud sparse signal with n, n/2
and n/3-secure, respectively. Fig.6 (e) displays the recovered
(a) (b)
Fig. 7. Cloud-assisted image encryption with uniform random perturbation
and amplitude random encryption. (a) n/2-secure. b) n/3-secure.
image at the end user. According to Fig.6, the recovered image
using cloud sparse signal leaks more details about the original
image with increasing the security level. The attacker can
obtain almost contour and many details of original image when
the encryption matrix is n/3-secure as shown in Fig.6 (d).
In order to enhance the visual encryption effectiveness, we
could further encrypt the amplitude of sparse signal with ran-
dom multiplication. For example, we can adopt the encryption
process as described in Eq.16 for each image block.
Ak = α · pik(I) (16)
where α is also a random value. It means that the encryption
pixel values of each block are multiplied by a same random
value. Fig.7 shows the experiment results of “Lenna” image
with n/2 and n/3-secure. The value of α is random selected
between 0 and 1. The experiment result displays that we only
obtain a little image information from visual aspect. However,
it cannot improve much help from attack aspect because all
the pixel values are carried out the same linear operation. The
goal of random amplitude encryption only perturbs the image
contour from visual aspect.
3) ROI Encryption: eCIS can also perform encryption
based on the user’s region of interest requirement. For exam-
ple, Fig.8 displays the experiment result of our scheme with
ROI image encryption and 24× 24 pixels of block size. Fig.8
(a) is the original “Barbara” image, the red block is the en-
cryption block of ROI. Fig.8 (b), (c) and (d) are the recovered
images according to the cloud recovery sparse signal. Fig.8
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Fig. 8. Cloud-assisted image encryption with region of interest. (a) Original image and selected ROI of “Barbara”. (b) n-secure. (c) n/2-secure. (d) n/2-secure
with random amplitude encryption. (e) Recovery image of end user.
(b) and (c) are n-secure and n/2-secure, respectively. Fig.8
(d) is the n/2-secure with random amplitude encryption and
0 < α < 1. Fig.8 (e) is the recovery image of end user. The
experiment result displays that we almost can not know the
details and contour of selected ROI according to Fig.8 (b) and
(d). Fig.8 (d) is sufficient ambiguous from visual aspect.
B. Overhead Evaluation
In this subsection, we evaluate the overhead of eCIS. We
mainly focus on computation cost at the sampling device
and end user. In order to effectively evaluate the overhead
of our scheme, we compare eCIS with the following ex-
isting schemes: (1) CS-based image process without cloud
service and security consideration (Orignial CS), (2) Cloud-
assisted and CS-based image process without security consid-
eration (Cloud Non encryption), and (3) Cloud-assisted and
CS-based image process with security consideration by LP
problem transformation [25].
For ease of presentation, we implement different schemes
with the same size of image block, 24×24, 32×32, and 48×48
pixels of block size. All the results represent the mean of 50
experiments and each experiment is randomly selected one
block from the same test image. We implement our scheme
with uniformly random perturbation and n-secure. OMP algo-
rithm is selected to solve `1 optimization problem [23]. Let
tsd and teu denote the running time of sampling device and
end user, respectively. In this experiment, we do not consider
the image sampling time. tsd is the image compression time
for Original CS and Cloud Non encryption schemes. For our
scheme, tsd is the compression and encryption time. teu
is the time of solving `1 optimization problem and image
recovery for Original CS scheme. teu is only the time of
image recovery for Cloud Non encryption schemes. In our
scheme, teu is the time of image decryption and recovery.
Table.I displays the mean running time (in seconds) com-
parisons of Orignial CS, Cloud Non encryption, and eCIS.
The last column of Table.I represents the system speedup
compared our scheme with Orignial CS scheme. The first
and the second sub-columns represent the time speedup of
sampling device and end user, respectively. The last sub-
column is the total time (Ttotal = Tsd + Teu) speedup
without considering the time spent on the cloud. According
to Table.I, our running time only increases 1.2× ∼ 1.7× to
obtain encryption function for sampling device under different
block sizes compared with Orignial CS scheme. In [25], LP
problem transformation scheme requires 5.6× and 9.4× time
cost compared with Orignial CS scheme to obtain encryption
function for 32×32, 48×48 pixels of block sizes, respectively.
Meanwhile, our scheme can decrease 4.6× ∼ 7.7× time
cost for end user compared with Orignial CS scheme. For
total time speedup, the experimental result displays that our
eCIS decrease 4.1× ∼ 6.8× time cost. Even when compared
with Cloud Non encryption schemes, our running time only
increases by up to 2× in end user. In [25], the authors didn’t
consider the final image recovery cost. They decreases the total
running time 4.0× and 3.4× with 32× 32 and 48× 48 pixels
of block size, respectively. Without considering the image
recovery time, our scheme decreases the total running time
8.9× and 11.7× with 32 × 32 and 48 × 48 pixels of block
size of “Lenna”, respectively. For the image of “Soccer”, our
scheme decrease the total running time by 8.37× and 12.7×
with 32× 32 and 48× 48 pixels of block sizes, respectively.
The experiment result shows that eCIS can keep the user’s
image privacy with low-complexity compared with the existing
cloud-assisted image service scheme.
VII. RELATED WORK
Image compression and encryption: Image compression
technology can be divided into two categories, transform-
based compression and CS-based compression. Existing image
encryption technology is mainly aimed at transform-based
compression image such as [8], [17], [26]. Transform-based
compression technology requires high computation complexity
and storage cost for encoder. This type of image compression
technology is not suitable for resource-constrained smart de-
vice. CS-based image compression technology can shift the
complexity from encoder to decoder. Although CS theory and
its applications have received lots of researches in recent years
[7], [18], [9], [29], [15], CS-based image encryption tech-
nology also require high computation complexity [16], [28].
These methods are not appropriate for resource-constrained
smart device. For resource-constrained smart device user, these
two types of compression and encryption technology not
directly meet the requirement of user’s privacy and system
resource.
Secure computation outsourcing: With the development
of cloud computing in recent years, cloud provides an new
avenue for storage and computation outsourcing according to
TABLE I
MEAN RUNNING TIME COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT BLOCK SIZE (IN SECONDS).
Image Block size Original CS Cloud Non encryption Our scheme Speedup
Tsd Teu Tsd Teu Tsd Trec Tsd Teu Ttotal
Lenna
24× 24 0.0056 0.17824 0.00566 0.0263 0.00904 0.0344 -1.7× 5.2× 4.2×
32× 32 0.01828 0.64044 0.0168 0.0835 0.02278 0.13748 -1.3× 4.6× 4.1×
48× 48 0.08816 5.73816 0.0884 0.40624 0.1125 0.79696 -1.3× 7.2× 6.4×
Soccer
24× 24 0.0056 0.16688 0.00498 0.02654 0.00694 0.03284 -1.2× 5.1× 4.3×
32× 32 0.0175 0.65472 0.01784 0.08304 0.02808 0.14042 -1.6× 4.7× 4.0×
48× 48 0.08764 5.8582 0.09118 0.41128 0.11528 0.76554 -1.3× 7.7× 6.8×
the user’s demand [2]. One advantage of cloud paradigm is
resource outsourcing for resource-constrained smart device.
However, cloud is public and exists lots of security threat such
as data transmission security, data storage security and so on
[27], [21]. Cloud-based computation outsourcing has also been
studied by many researchers. For example, C. Wang et. al have
proposed a secure and practical outsourcing of linear program-
ming scheme in cloud computing [24]. In [13], [3], the authors
also proposed many schemes to encrypt input and output and
implement secure computation outsourcing. These methods are
all following the thought of fully homomorphic encryption
[14], and transform the original LP problem into another
LP problem. Since CS decoding is equivalent to solve LP
problem, C. Wang et.al. proposed a cloud-assisted computation
outsourcing scheme for healthcare video monitoring [25]. This
proposal also require high complexity transformation operation
to implement secure computation outscourcing.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we discussed a novel encrypressive low-
complexity cloud-assisted image service scheme via compres-
sive sensing. Although traditional image encryption and secure
linear programming outsourcing techniques can efficiently
protect image privacy, these methods are not appropriate for
resource-constrained device because of high computational
cost. Our scheme can efficiently transform the computation
and storage cost to the cloud without increasing transmission
cost, and protect image privacy according to user’s adaptive
security demand. Extensive experiment results demonstrated
our scheme can significantly save the system running time. In
our scheme, we only consider one-dimension CS-based image
compression and encryption. Future work will extend to two-
dimension image compression and encryption to further reduce
network transmission cost.
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